Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series

September 20, 2016

ESTABLISHING PROXIMITY-BASED TRUST
OF NEARBY DEVICES THROUGH AUDIO
COMMUNICATION
David Aristizabal
Adam Liss

Follow this and additional works at: http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Recommended Citation
Aristizabal, David and Liss, Adam, "ESTABLISHING PROXIMITY-BASED TRUST OF NEARBY DEVICES THROUGH AUDIO
COMMUNICATION", Technical Disclosure Commons, (September 20, 2016)
http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/279

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Aristizabal and Liss: ESTABLISHING PROXIMITY-BASED TRUST OF NEARBY DEVICES THROUGH AUDI

ESTABLISHING PROXIMITY-BASED TRUST OF NEARBY DEVICES THROUGH
AUDIO COMMUNICATION
ABSTRACT
A method for establishing proximity-based trust of nearby devices through audio
communication is disclosed. The method includes a protocol for devices that communicate over
audio within a predetermined distance from each other to verify proximity. A packet token is
included at the end of each packet. After each packet ends broadcasting, the sending device
listens for a response from the receiving device for a window of time corresponding to the time it
takes for sound to make a round-trip through the predetermined distance. This mechanism could
be used in mobile application development where applications are required to ensure co-presence
within a specified distance from another device as a criterion for trust.
BACKGROUND
Currently, direct audio communication between nearby mobile devices is possible.
Typically, the devices exchange some kind of token over audio by sending an ultrasound
message which helps in establishing co-presence. An audio communication could be intercepted
from relatively long distances, for example, by using a parabolic microphone. So, an attacker
could easily obtain co-presence tokens from a distance and trick other devices into thinking the
attacker’s device is nearby. By broadcasting at a high volume or by using an acoustic mirror, the
attacker’s device may also communicate with other devices at a distance. For example, this
technology could be used to easily share a Wi-Fi key with guest devices or to seamlessly connect
new Internet of Things devices to a user’s home network, but only if both devices are within a
predetermined distance. An attacker outside the user’s home network can initiate a request and

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2016

2

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 279 [2016]

by misrepresenting itself as a trusted entity, steal the Wi-Fi key, thereby gaining unauthorized
access to the user’s home network.
In another example, a driver may want to unlock a car with a smartphone application that
operates via the cellular data network. However, this leaves the car vulnerable to hackers
anywhere on the Internet. That vulnerability is eliminated by requiring the user to be physically
near the car.
As a third example, many residential gas and electric meters can now be read
electronically. It is conceivable that a criminal can determine when a homeowner is away for an
extended time by “war driving” through a neighborhood and reading the meters on each house.
This becomes impossible if the reader must be within several feet of the meter in order to read it.
To satisfy this requirement, a method that ensures co-presence of devices within a
specified distance is proposed. The method verifies proximity of the intended device and thereby
thwarts security attacks and privacy breaches.
DESCRIPTION
A method for establishing proximity-based trust of nearby devices through audio
communication is disclosed. A protocol by which two devices could communicate over audio,
ensuring that they are within a predetermined distance from each other, is presented. The
protocol is implemented when a user wishes a device to initiate communication with another.
The method is as follows:
1. The two peer devices (A and B, respectively) take turns to broadcast packets over audio.
2. After either device sends a packet, it listens for a response from the other device for a
predetermined window of time. The window corresponds to the time it takes for sound to
make a round-trip through the maximum allowable distance between A and B.
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3. Each packet ends with a random packet token, ensuring the receiver must wait for the
entire packet before it can initiate the response.
4. Upon receiving any packet, each device returns its token in some form, in addition to any
data payload it transmits.
5. When a device receives a packet within the allowed window, it verifies that the previous
packet token is valid, thereby ensuring proximity of its peer. Packets that begin outside
the window, or that contain invalid tokens, are discarded as fraudulent.
An implementation of the method, as shown in FIG. 1, illustrates three devices: two user
devices, A and B, and an attacker device, E. A predetermined distance D, measured from device
A is designated as safe distance. Devices A and B are near each other at a distance less than D
and are trusted to communicate with each other by virtue of their proximity. Device E represents
a potential attacker’s device, at a distance greater than D from both A and B. E is not trusted to
communicate with A because it is not close enough.

FIG. 1: Establishing co-presence of devices placed within A’s sphere of trust, i.e. within
a trusted distance from A.
It is possible for the attacker E located beyond the predetermined distance D to broadcast
a packet ahead of time such that it arrives at one of the devices during the listening window. The
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packet token mechanism described above ensures that such a packet from attacker E would be
invalid, since the attacker would not be able to predict the value of the packet token ahead of
time, i.e. before the sound arrives at the attacker’s location. The time window described above is
such that an attacker exactly at the predetermined distance would not have time to broadcast a
packet after receiving the packet token, and have that packet arrive at A within the listening
window.
Timing for a packet sent from device A and a response from B, as well as how the
listening window of time physically prevents a valid packet sent by E from reaching A in time,
are illustrated in FIG. 2. Note that device E could send a valid packet after receiving A’s packet
token, which is at the end of A’s message. B sends a response packet, which arrives within A’s
listening window. Device E tries to send a valid packet from exactly distance D, but it arrives at
A at the end of the listening window or beyond, so A ignores it, as shown in FIG. 2.
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FIG. 2: Listening window of time for ensuring co-presence of devices

In the implementation of the method, the packet token is included at the end of each
packet to ensure that an attacker must wait until the end of the packet arrives before it can craft a
valid response packet. Each packet is cryptographically combined with the most recently
received packet token in such a way that an attacker cannot craft a valid response packet without
first receiving the entire packet token. The purpose is to ensure that every bit of the response
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depends on every bit of the packet token. A simple implementation of this step might use the
previous packet token as a seed to generate a random stream of bits and exclusive or (XOR) the
result with the bits of the packet before transmission.

A

B
Packet A1: [“START” | TA1]

1

2
Packet B1: [“ABC” | TB1] ⊕

3

4
Packet A2: [“ZYX” | TA2] ⊕

5

6
...
FIG. 3: Sequence of packet transmissions

FIG. 3: illustrates the following sequence:
1. A initiates communication and appends a random packet token, TA1.
2. B receives Packet A1.
3. B responds with “ABC” and appends a new random packet token, TB1. It uses
TA1, the token it received from A, to seed a string of random bits, R(TA1), which
it XORs with its reply.
4. A receives the packet, computes the same string of random bits, R(TA1), and
again XORs it with the packet to restore the original data.
5. A responds with “ZYX” and appends a new random packet token, TA2. It uses
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token TB1, which it received from B, to generate R(TB1), which it XORs with its
reply.
6. B receives the packet and XORs it with R(TB1) to restore the original data.
It is not necessary that each packet contain an entire message, as the packets must arrive
in order and can accumulate within each device until a complete message has been received.
Each packet contains a relatively small number of bits, so long messages are split into multiple
packets.
Standard mechanisms for error detection and correction may be used. However, a retry
limit should be enforced to prevent an attacker from simply guessing the packet tokens until it
succeeds.
Definitions and equations describing physical properties and limitations associated with
the method are presented:
Description

Units

Notes

Predetermined maximum safe distance

D

m

Distance between two nearby devices

d

m

Bit rate of data transmitted over audio

b

bits/s

Speed of sound in air*

v

m/s

Worst case: v = 360 m/s

Listening window

Tw

s

Tw = 2D/v

Maximum length of response

Tt

s

2(D - d)/v

Maximum packet length

B

bits

B = floor(b × Tt) = floor[2b(D d)/v]

d<D

* The speed of sound in air varies with several factors, of which temperature and
humidity are the most significant. Its approximate range is from 330 m/s at 0° C and 0%
humidity to 360 m/s at 40° C and 100% humidity. This information can be used to calculate the
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listening window using the worst-case conditions (highest speed of sound, leading to the shortest
listening window) for reasonable environmental conditions.
The maximum packet length depends greatly on how close the two devices are and the
predetermined maximum safe distance. Examples using arbitrary but practical parameters are
shown below:
Given D = 10 m, d = 5 m, b = 1000 bits/s
Tw = 55.6 m
Tt = 27.8 ms
B = 27 bits

Given D = 10 m, d = 2 m, b = 1000 bits/s
Tw = 55.6 m
Tt = 44.4 ms
B = 44 bits

The packet layout could be used from existing protocols for audio transmission, with
slight modification to include the packet token at the end. If not modifying an existing protocol,
here is an example of a possible way to lay out a packet.
Length

Payload

Checksum

Packet Token

Here, everything but the length is cryptographically combined with the previous packet token
(except on the first packet).
Length: Size of the entire packet.
Payload: Message data.
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Checksum: Used for error detection or correction.
Packet Token: Ensures proximity, per discussion above.
In some variations of the method, the listening window may be modified such that the
condition is for the beginning of the packet to arrive within the window, and then the devices
continue to listen until the end of the packet however long it may be, along with some kind
checksum or hash mechanism to ensure that E is not able to modify the portion of the packet that
arrives outside of the listening window.
In another variation, devices are allowed to transmit additional packets during their
listening window to increase data throughput, in effect sending two consecutive packets and
expecting two consecutive, corresponding responses.
In another variation, instead of assuming some worst-case distance between trusted
devices, they could measure the response time to estimate their actual distance and adjust the
maximum packet size accordingly. The closer the devices are together, the bigger the packets the
devices could send within the listening window.
In another variation, the disclosed method could be extended to an arbitrary number of n
devices. For example, device A could verify the proximity of the other devices, B, C, etc. in turn.
Once this is completed, device A will have verified that all other devices are nearby, and all
devices will also have verified that A is near them. C can then ask A to verify that B is nearby.
In an example application, devices could exchange public encryption keys using the
disclosed protocol. After the exchange of public keys, the devices can use those keys as proof of
initial proximity and continue to communicate over any mechanism using standard Public Key
Encryption methods for signing and encryption. For example, device A would send a message to
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B encrypted and signed in a way that ensures A knows only B can decrypt it, and B knows only
A could have signed it.
In a second example application, one device, A, can securely share a secret, like a Wi-Fi
network key, with a nearby device, B. The user would initiate the process, e.g. by pressing a
button on each device. The devices would establish proof of proximity and exchange public keys
as described in the example application above. Device A can then transmit the secret encrypted
and signed such that only B can decrypt it and verify that it was sent by A. The transmission can
happen over the disclosed method, or another mechanism, e.g. a different audio protocol,
Bluetooth, Ethernet, Wi-Fi, etc.
In a third example application, two internet-connected devices, A and B, can establish
proof of proximity prior to interacting with each other through a cloud service. The devices
would establish proof of proximity and exchange public keys as described in the example above.
A cloud service can then broker a high-bandwidth connection between the two devices, where
each device uses standard mechanisms for securing their connection to the cloud service, e.g.
HTTPS, SSL, TLS.
The described protocol does not gather, use or store personal information about users. In
situations in which specific implementations using the described protocol may collect or use
personal information about users (e.g., user data, information about a user’s social network,
user’s location, user’s biometric information, user’s activities and demographic information),
users are provided with one or more opportunities to control whether the personal information is
collected, whether the personal information is stored, whether the personal information is used,
and how the information is collected about the user, stored and used.
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